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Brazil’s Maria da Penha domestic violence police patrols:1




This article examines an innovative domestic violence intervention: some 300 ‘second-6
response’ police patrols set up since 2015 by military police forces and municipal guards in7
cities around Brazil. They enforce court-issued protection orders by paying repeat visits to8
women at high risk, referring them to support services, and ensuring abusers stay away.9
Drawing on interviews with officers who founded or now lead these patrols, and on local-10
level police data and studies, the article analyses their origins and modus operandi, and11
evaluates their impacts on victims, abusers, the community, and internal police force culture.12
Available evidence shows that victims enrolled in these programmes are much less likely to13
suffer repeated assault or feminicide than those who are not. The article examines how this14
intervention fits with the other elements of local protection networks and compares these15
patrols to second-response police interventions developed elsewhere.16
17




This article examines an innovation in police intervention in domestic violence in Brazil: the22
300 or so patrols set up since 2015 by military police forces and municipal guards in cities23
around the country. The main function of these second-response units, generally known as24
‘Maria da Penha’ (hereafter MdP) patrols after the eponymous 2006 law on domestic25
violence, is to enforce court-issued protection orders by paying repeat visits to women at high26
risk of further violence, referring them to support services, and ensuring that the abusers stay27
away. The article analyses their origins and modus operandi and evaluates their impacts on28
victims, abusers, the wider community, and internal police force culture. From a ‘what29
works’ perspective, available evidence shows that victims enrolled in the MdP patrol30
programmes are much less likely to suffer repeated assault or feminicide than those who are31
not. The article compares their approach to second-response police interventions developed32
elsewhere and examines the degree to which this intervention contributes to the protection33




This research was designed firstly to map the emergence and operational characteristics of38
the MdP patrols, and secondly to estimate their impact. Answering the first research objective39
is complicated by the highly decentralized nature of law enforcement in Brazil: each of the 2640
states and the Federal District operates both a military and a civil police force. One fifth of41
Brazil’s 5,570 municipalities also operate a municipal guard, largely deployed in a preventive,42
community policing role. There is no central database listing the location and active43
operational status of MdP patrols, and very little published in the secondary literature, even44
though some patrols have attracted ‘best practice’ prizes from government, civil society,45
media outlets and international bodies. The number of MdP patrols in existence (as of June46
2021) has been estimated by compiling data supplied by state-level military police forces and47
gleaned from the state appellate courts, which often sign agreements with municipal guards48
in the absence of military police initiatives. For the analysis of operational practices, the49
article draws on primary data, including local ordinances and internal standing orders setting50
out guidelines for local MdP patrols, data provided by police forces, and localized empirical51
studies, often produced by police ‘pracademics’, that is, officers enrolled in academic52
programmes in which they carried out primary research. In addition, between 2019 and 2021,53
I conducted eleven formal interviews with pioneers/coordinators of the MdP patrols in São54
Paulo city and in the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais, Maranhão, Paraíba, Bahia,55
Mato Grosso and Espírito Santo, and with officers working with victim protection networks56
in Ceará, Goiás, and Piauí states. Between 2016-20 I also engaged in informal conversations57
with dozens of MdP patrol officers who were among the 450 participants in training sessions58
that I ran whilst developing a police training manual on gender-based violence with the59
Brazilian Forum on Public Safety (FBSP, 2020b). The latter’s project of documenting ‘good60
practices’ in policing gender-based violence also provided rich data from around the country.61
With regard to impact, data must be treated with caution. Brazilian police recorded62
3,730 female homicides in 2019 (FBSP, 2020a, p. 116). Around half were likely committed63
by a current or former intimate partner, and should be classified as feminicides, which64
Brazilian law distinguishes from female homicides and defines as murders motivated by65
contempt for, or a discriminatory attitude towards, women, or committed within the context66
of domestic violence (Macaulay, 2021, pp. 44-46). However, many local law enforcement67
agencies still systematically under-record feminicides. As this improves, the number of68
feminicides will appear to rise, whereas in reality this simply reflects changed recording69
practices.70
There are similar problems in relation to non-lethal domestic violence. In the first71
half of 2020, women in Brazil reported 110,791 cases of bodily harm, and 238,174 cases of72
threat to the police (FBSP, 2020, pp. 32-33). As these offences are persistently under-73
reported, changes over time can be subject to confounding variables. For example, the Covid-74
19 context of local lockdowns in Brazil in 2020 likely explains a drop of around 10 per cent75
and 18 per cent in reports of bodily harm and threats in relation to 2019. Also, as the criminal76
justice system response to domestic abuse improves and victims feel more confident to report77
incidents, the numbers of reported incidents will rise. This, a lack of baseline victimization78
surveys, and uneven police recording practices are major caveats to interpreting either time79
series or comparative data across different jurisdictions. Thus, like most international studies80
of police interventions in domestic violence, this article examines evidence from city-level81
studies.82
83
CHANGING POLICE INTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE84
85
As an offence, domestic violence has distinctive features that have shaped police approaches86
to intervention. It encompasses a wide spectrum of abusive behaviours that interfere with the87
autonomy, safety, and dignity of the victim. These include psychological, emotional,88
financial, and sexual abuse, as well as physical assault, which can occur over a very long89
period, creating victims who are unable, for many reasons, to escape their user. Women are90
revictimized, showing up in police data individually as ‘hot dots’, their households as ‘hot91
spots’ (Farrell, 2015; Pease et al, 2018).92
Like victims, offenders are a heterogeneous group (Piquero et al, 2006). Some are93
‘escalators’, although intensification from verbal to physical violence may not be linear or94
predictable. In many cases of feminicide in Brazil and elsewhere, a verbal threat may be the95
only harbinger of a deadly assault. Improved understanding of domestic violence as a form of96
coercive control (Stark, 2009) or ‘patriarchal terrorism’ (Johnson, 1995) helps to explain such97
behavior. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, 44 per cent of men accused of feminicide in 201998
said they were motivated by rage at the victim ending their relationship (Mendes, 2020, p.99
141), consistent with data from other states and international patterns. Conversely, some100
abusers are ‘de-escalators’: an episode of violence may be followed by a ‘honeymoon’ period101
of reconciliation. Victims recognise this lull in violence for what it is, a respite between102
outbursts of abuse. And some abusers maintain a stable low, or high, level of abuse over a103
prolonged period.104
In response, victims become skilled managers of their own security (Monckton Smith,105
Williams & Mullane, 2014). In seeking to maintain equilibrium, they may not seek help from106
the police, or disengage after first contact, if the police intervention does not create a new,107
safer equilibrium but instead provokes the abuser to further violence. As a minimum, then,108
police interventions should do no harm, and not leave the victim more vulnerable. Police109
response to domestic violence has also changed markedly since the 1970s. Reluctance to110
intervene in ‘private’ family conflicts regarded as ‘not real crimes’ has, to a large extent, been111
overridden by new laws that mandate the first-responder police attending an emergency call-112
out to arrest the aggressor (Buzawa, 2012). These laws were encouraged by a landmark113
experimental field study conducted in Minneapolis in the early 1980s that found that police114
arrest had a deterrent effect on re-offending (Sherman & Berk, 1984). However, further115
experiments revealed that arrests had no overall effect (Sherman et al, 1992a), a finding116
confirmed in a more recent meta-analysis of 11 studies (Hoppe et al, 2020). In fact, arrest had117
a negative effect on socially marginalized offenders with a non-conformist mindset, making118
them more likely to re-offend (Sherman et al, 1992b).119
Police forces then began following up with victims as a protection strategy. But such120
second-response interventions, and literature detailing their impact, are much rarer. One121
pioneering project was the Domestic Violence Home-Visit Intervention, started in New122
Haven in 2000. Within 72 hours of a domestic violence incident being reported to the police,123
a police-advocacy team comprising specially trained officers from the local community124
policing unit and clinicians or social workers specialized in child trauma and protection,125
would conduct a home visit (Stover et al, 2009). Over several visits, information about legal126
and support services was given. The clearest positive impact was that victims were more127
likely to access child support services and to report further offences to the police. However,128
analysis of this and similar second-response interventions showed that they still did not129
reduce the likelihood of repeat assault or encourage the victim to leave the abuser (Stover,130
2012; Davis, Weisburd & Hamilton, 2010). A different approach is that taken by the Chula131
Vista, California, police department, which implemented a ‘graduated response protocol’ for132
domestic incidents between intimate partners. This attempted to avoid direct criminal justice133
interventions and instead change the norms and behavior within the couple with educational134
messaging, written warnings, in-person follow-up visits to suspects and victims, and135
customized problem-solving. Findings showed a reduction in domestic violence crimes by 24136
per cent (Schmerler et al, 2020), indicating that it is the nature and detailed procedures of the137
police follow-through with victims and perpetrators that really matter, a point amply138
demonstrated by the MdP patrols.139
140
BRAZILIAN POLICE INTERVENTIONS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE141
142
Despite Brazil’s very high levels of social violence and the poor reputation of its police143
forces, the country has been a pioneer in offering new policing responses to gender-based144
violence. In 1985 the world’s first ever ‘women’s police station’, was installed in the centre145
of São Paulo (Santos, 2005). Run by the civil police, they multiplied across the country and146
were emulated elsewhere, promising women a more sympathetic and effective environment147
in which to report domestic or sexual abuse than ordinary police stations. However, their role148
in potentially preventing revictimization has been limited by their relatively low number for149
the size of the country, and spatial concentration in coastal, metropolitan areas. In 2019, only150
417 municipalities reported having a women’s police station, a decrease from the 441151
registered in 2014 (IBGE, 2020). The stations’ remit also varies: in some states women are152
expected to report domestic or sexual violence only at a women’s station, in others, any153
precinct will register a case. Some women’s stations will handle any crime committed against154
a woman, not just domestic or sexual abuse, and some extend their remit to other vulnerable155
groups such as children and the elderly, somewhat diluting their focus on gender-based156
offences. Similarly, the other support structures, such as refuges for battered women, are also157
unevenly distributed and relatively sparse. Thus, many victims of domestic violence will find158
themselves unable to receive dedicated support from a women’s police station or to leave159
their homes and find safe accommodation.160
On the other hand, the military police is the one law enforcement institution with161
universal coverage across the national territory, with some 450,000 officers compared to the162
civil police’s 100,000. State military police forces also consistently report that domestic163
violence incidents constitute the single largest category of calls to their emergency hotlines,164
especially at night. In the first six months of 2019, the Rio de Janeiro police recorded 30,617165
domestic violence-related calls (18.6 per cent of the total volume). Beyond the clear demand166
for first response police action, the need for effective second-response intervention to enforce167
court-issued emergency protection orders was also becoming clear (Azevedo et al., 2016).168
Some 12 per cent of orders granted in Federal District between 2006 and 2012 were breached,169
with no system for checking on victims or recording their reports of violations (Diniz &170
Gumieri, 2016, p. 219). In the months leading up to the establishment of the MdP patrols as a171
state-wide policy, Rio de Janeiro’s state law enforcement agency was seeing over 5,000172
military police units despatched a month to emergency calls relating to domestic violence.173
Yet, only a very small percentage of those incidents – 8.2 per cent – ended up being officially174
reported as crimes against women, due to victim reluctance to proceed (TJERJ, 2019).175
Victims’ loss of faith in the police after the initial contact also reflected how they were176
treated. Qualitative interviews carried out in Porto Alegre with 21 women seeking assistance177
with domestic violence, and 25 service providers inside criminal justice, health and social178
work agencies, revealed a system that was disjointed, slow and unresponsive, and often179
unsympathetic to the victim and her needs (Meneghel et al, 2011). The needs of victims,180
alongside a number of other factors both internal and external to the military police, meant181
that second-response police interventions emerged simultaneously in diverse states across182
Brazil. This occurred in an organic and decentralized way, eventually crystallizing into the183
MdP patrol model.184
Internally, operational thinking began to change with the spread of community-185
oriented policing (COP) experiments that cropped up across Brazil in the 1980s and 1990s.186
The international literature shows that COP approaches encourage greater attention to187
preventive policing to protect vulnerable social groups. Thus, in the Federal District of188
Brasília, the Prevention of Family and Domestic Violence second-response units developed189
out of a COP literacy project run by the military police in a low-income neighborhood. It190
quickly shifted focus to domestic violence prevention, and in 2011 the first military police191
officers were trained for a dedicated patrol, with the project institutionalized in 2014 (TJ-192
DFT & PMDF, 2015). Similarly, in nearby Goiás state, COP experiments in the early 2000s193
led the military police to establish a community policing centre in 2013 (Pinheiro, 2020, p.194
115) to which the MdP patrols would later be attached.195
Another driver was the adoption of North American problem-solving, data-led,196
results-oriented, and preventive policing approaches, which relied on the quantitative and197
qualitative analysis of crime data to identify hot spots. MdP patrols frequently start life as198
pilot projects in hot spot areas. Some of the earliest, in Porto Alegre, were initiated in four199
high-violence neighborhoods where a community policing programme already operated200
(Grossi & Spaniol, 2019). In Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul, two of the states where, in201
the early 2000s, senior officers began to develop second-response policing projects on their202
own initiative, they were spurred by data and literature on repeat victimization to identify203
domestic violence as a policing priority (Moreira, 2006; Gerhard, 2014). In the former, the204
officer was influenced by studies urging immediate intervention so that the aggressor did not205
feel emboldened and victims were not left more vulnerable, processes that Pease (1998)206
termed ‘event boosts’ and ‘flags’. He also took inspiration from first- and second-response207
protocols developed by British police forces in the 1990s (Moreira, 2006).208
Hot spot/hot dot data analysis also underpinned many state-level homicide reduction209
initiatives developed in the last two decades. These brought together multiple stakeholders210
across local government to design tailored strategies aimed at reducing murder rates in211
particular localities or affecting specific social groups. While the vast majority of domestic212
violence cases will not end in murder, prioritization of homicide reduction nonetheless213
provided justification and dedicated resources for domestic violence policing because of214
awareness that many feminicide cases were the culmination of domestic violence cases that215
had not received police attention. For example, in 2016, the law enforcement administration216
of Espírito Santo state established the MdP patrols as part of the cross-government homicide217
reduction programme, Estado Presente. At a local policing level, individual battalions218
similarly developed projects that became the precursors of MdP patrols. In 2014, in Rio de219
Janeiro state, the 10th battalion set up a tactical group called ‘Guardians of Life’ to tackle220
homicides of children, the elderly, and women. The project soon focussed on preventing221
intimate partner violence and feminicide when crime report analysis demonstrated that222
women constituted the bulk of vulnerable victims. The following year, the 38th battalion in223
Três Rios copied the initiative, creating the model project on which the subsequent state-wide224
MdP programme, created in 2019, was based (Guimarães & Barros, 2017; Mendes et al, 2020,225
p. 149). As a result of these factors, in many states, the MdP patrols are institutionally226
embedded within local, preventive COP units, and linked at headquarters to the state-wide227
strategic planning and homicide reduction programmes. This enabled states such as Rio de228
Janeiro, Goiás, Mato Grosso, Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais to institutionalize the MdP229
patrols and extend their coverage right across the state territory.230
The main factor external to the police has been the 2006 Maria da Penha law on231
domestic violence and women’s movement pressure on the state to implement it. The law is232
named after a victim of attempted feminicide, whose husband remained at liberty years later233
due to the slowness of the Brazilian courts. The Inter-American Commission on Human234
Rights’ review of her case included a stinging criticism of the Brazilian government, which235
led to a broad-based feminist coalition developing a comprehensive law. This legislation gave236
impetus to early versions of the MdP patrols by explicitly placing new responsibilities on the237
police forces tasked with crime prevention and first response (military police and municipal238
guards), not just on the police dedicated to investigation (the civil police).239
The law is novel in emphasizing protection and prevention (46 articles) over penal240
aspects such as mandatory arrest and punishment (four articles). Articles 10 and 11 further241
stipulate that the first-responder police must assist a victim who has been, or is about, to be242
assaulted; get her to a hospital, a safe place or a police station; and escort her back home to243
retrieve her belongings, if necessary. Article 22 empowers the courts to grant a wide range of244
measures intended to assist the victim, keep her and her children in their own home, where245
possible, and get her social welfare, health and legal assistance. The ‘urgent protective246
measures’ that the judge can decree include removal of the aggressor from the family home,247
and restraining orders prohibiting him from contacting or coming near the victim. The law’s248
emphasis on protective and preventive provisions gave police a reason to work with local249
victim support networks and legitimated new initiatives. In Rio Grande do Sul, in 2011, a250
senior military police commander set up ‘Operation Peaceful Family’ to enforce the251
protection orders in her area. This attracted the attention of the state governor, who invited252
her to roll out the project in the capital. Thus, in July 2012, the very first patrols to bear the253
name of Maria da Penha were launched. They have since spread to all regions of Brazil254
through a process of horizontal policy mobility and transfer between police forces, with the255
patrol founders in Rio Grande do Sul and in Bahia, which copied the former’s model,256
becoming the key multipliers of the project.257
258
HOW THE PATROLS FUNCTION259
260
Broadly speaking, all of the MdP patrols function in the same basic way because their261
primary duty is to provide the protection, enforcement and prevention outlined in the law. A262
woman reports domestic violence, either through an emergency hotline, or in person at a263
police station. After an assessment of her situation, a request for urgent protective measures264
is made to the court. The local MdP patrol receives the details of the case and visits the265
victim’s home. The patrol team, generally composed of a male and a female officer, speaks to266
the victim to inform her of her rights and refer her to other partners in the local support267
network. The perpetrator is separately informed that he is at risk of arrest if he breaks any of268
the court orders. Thereafter the patrol visits the victim at home, or at work, periodically over269
a set period of time. The visits may be weekly, but could be less or more frequent, and can be270
pre-arranged, or unscheduled. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the patrols have made much271
greater use of electronic communication to check on their clients’ welfare.272
The operating practices of the MdP patrols in different states and municipalities vary273
slightly, depending on the configuration of local institutional partnerships. For example, risk274
assessment and triaging of priority cases to pass on to the MdP patrol command may be275
carried out, variously, by the first response police, the officer in charge of the police precinct276
receiving the complaint, the women’s police station chief, the prosecutor’s office, or by the277
court (especially if this is a specialist Family and Domestic Violence Court), either by the278
judge alone, or in conjunction with its multidisciplinary professional team. Different agencies279
use different risk assessment forms, although there have been attempts to standardize these280
(Macaulay, 2021, pp 94-96).281
Police have up to 48 hours to file a request for protective measures and the court has282
up to 48 hours to make a decision. Once granted, the courts either inform the aggressor and283
victims of the order, which they must then collect in person, or deliver the information284
through court officials or the police. However, domestic violence situations can be volatile,285
and this four-day wait leaves the victim exposed. Thus, in some locations the MdP patrols286
will visit victims as soon as a report has been made, or a request filed for protection. Some287
states now have fast-track protocols and will process a request for a restraining order within288
four hours.289
Whilst local inter-agency arrangements are sui generis, there have been attempts, led290
by one of the key multipliers of the MdP patrols, Major Denice Santiago, to standardize the291
service offered to victims. She provides to other states and municipalities setting up patrols292
Bahia’s model Technical Cooperation Agreement, which outlines the distinct and293
interlocking responsibilities of the various criminal justice system agencies and local294
government bodies. It specifies patrol operating practices in relation to initial risk assessment,295
data collection, and reporting on the victim’s status, providing standardized forms, so that296
information can be recorded properly and shared through the criminal justice system locally297




So, do the MdPs work? Just as there is no national database of where the patrols are in302
operation, there is also no national-level study of their impact. Like the second-response303
experiments in the USA cited above, studies tend to be city-level, consist of time-restricted304
snapshots, and there are no quasi-experimental studies. The quality of the data provided by305
police departments and used in such studies is highly variable (Grossi & Spaniol, 2019, p.306
323), creating benchmarking and methodological problems. Yet, overall, there is a307
consistency of reported findings across Brazil. Available evidence suggests that the MdP308
patrols have had a positive impact at several levels, firstly, and directly, on the victims and on309
the abusers; secondarily, on the local communities where they operate, and thirdly, on the310
police institutions and their attitudes towards community-oriented, preventive police work311
and domestic violence intervention.312
For the victims there are two metrics of success. One can be objectively measured: no313
further unwanted contact with the abuser and thus no need to report further abusive incidents314
to the police. There is also the subjective dimension of the victim’s personal sense of safety.315
Recognising this aspect of their role the patrols in Espírito Santo conduct visitas316
tranquilizadoras (‘reassurance visits’). There is consistent evidence that enrolment in the317
MdP patrol programme reduces revictimization. Police data from Manaus showed that of 628318
women in the programme between September 2014 and February 2017 only 7 per cent had319
suffered renewed violence (Silvestre, 2018, p. 112). A study in Belém do Pará compared320
police records for 154 women served by the MdP patrol between 2016 and 2019. Prior to321
enrolment, 22 per cent of women had reported three incidents to the police, and 16 per cent322
had reported four. After enrolment, 60 per cent reported no further incidents, and 22 per cent323
reported only one further incident (Bernardo, 2019 p. 110). Similarly, interviews with 37324
MdP programme clients in Vila Velha, Espírito Santo state, found that 65 per cent had not325
had to call the police again (Braga, 2017, pp. 43-53). This study replicated an earlier326
questionnaire employed by one of the pioneers of the patrols, Lt Col Nádia Gerhard whose327
extensive study surveyed the impact on 147 of the 1,468 women assisted by the MdP patrol328
between October 2012 and October 2013 in Porto Alegre (Gerhard, 2014, pp. 144-161). In329
terms of user satisfaction, 94 per cent of respondents rated the service as good or excellent in330
Porto Alegre, as did 87 per cent in Vila Velha. The overwhelming majority – 88 and 95 per331
cent respectively – reported that the restraining order alone had not been sufficient to make332
them feel safe, and 91 per cent and 78 per cent agreed that they felt safer enrolled in the333
programme.334
The primary objective of the patrols is to enforce the stay-away order, that is, to335
influence the behavior of the abuser. Data provided by police forces typically give the336
number of arrests for violations. In the early days of the MdP patrols, a high number of337
arrests was often presented as demonstrating police success in the task of enforcement.338
However, increasingly a low number of arrests is being heralded as success in the task of339
deterrence (Hanashiro & Sobral, 2017, p. 40). In relation to the offender, the relevant metric340
is now prevention, not detention. The two studies above revealed that in 86 per cent of cases341
in Porto Alegre the order was being respected (65 per cent in Vila Velha). Like the Chula342
Vista project cited above, the police also employ behavioral modification tools. Police forces343
are also increasingly using electronic tagging to monitor the movements of abusers, alerting344
the wearer, the victim and police if they come within a certain range of the victim. As345
violation of a protection order became an imprisonable offence in 2018, abusers themselves346
will take evasive action to avoid a breach.347
The close monitoring of the abuser has also inhibited lethal violence, as one of the348
features of feminicide is the tendency of aggressors to stalk the victim. Most MdP349
programmes reported, in their data or interviews, that there had been not a single feminicide,350
actual or attempted, of a woman enrolled in the programme (Hanashiro & Sobral, 2017, p. 40;351
Hanashiro & Schlittler 2019, p. 47). Overwhelmingly, the victims of feminicide are those352
women who have not reported abuse to the police and therefore have no restraining order.353
Recent state-level data confirms this: 93 per cent of the 30 feminicide victims in 2019 in354
Mato Grosso do Sul had no protection order at the time of their murder (Roca, 2020). In Rio355
Grande do Sul, 94 per cent of 79 feminicide victims in 2020 held no restraining order and 82356
per cent had not previously reported any domestic abuse to the police (DPGV/DIPAM, 2021).357
358
Clearly, one of the most effective ways to prevent feminicide in the context of359
domestic abuse to increase women’s confidence in reporting to the police. The visibility of360
the patrols, with their specially badged vehicles, as well as the word-of-mouth effect from361
satisfied service-users, tends to spur other women in the community to report domestic abuse362
to the police for the first time. In Porto Alegre, 70 per cent of respondents said that at least363
one of their neighbors had done so (40 per cent in Vila Velha). The two studies also showed364
that trust in the police rose markedly. Most official reports show a surge in reporting of365
domestic violence and a concomitant rise in the number of protection orders issued where366
patrols are active. In Mato Grosso, the courts issued an average of 61 protection orders a367
month in 2019, which tripled to 190 a month in 2020.368
The accessibility and visibility of the patrols, which also conduct routine patrolling369
and policing work, have also led to greater trust in, and legitimacy for, a police presence in370
communities that are either neglected or overpoliced. This has the additional effect of371
validating community-oriented and preventive work within the military police, where there is372
still significant resistance. It furthermore validates law enforcement work on domestic373
violence, which is often seen as ‘not real policing’, a sinecure, and a waste of police374
resources. The patrols are also having some impact on gendered police cultures. Their375
proliferation has prompted the promotion of more women to command positions, whilst376
programmes have been developed inside some forces to deal with police officers who are377
themselves domestic abusers (Schlittler, 2019). Bahia, Maranhão and the Federal District378
military police now also have units dedicated to supporting female officers around domestic379
violence, sexual harassment and other forms of bullying and discrimination. That said, the380
military police’s highly militarized and macho culture remains embedded and reproduced in381
their training, hierarchy and internal discipline. The fact that a great deal of routine police382
patrol work involves informal conflict resolution and social assistance, and that second-383
response policing is centred on care for victims, is unlikely, in the absence of deeper384
structural reforms, to override police cultures built around masculinity and the use of force. It385
is more likely that the MdP patrols will create a bounded sub-culture within police forces,386





The MdP patrols represent a significant innovation as a second-response intervention in392
situations of domestic abuse from which Northern countries could learn. There are393
similarities to the US experiments mentioned earlier: the law mandates arrests for offences394
involving physical injury, the patrols make visits to the household post-offence, and they395
consciously seek to modify the conduct of the abuser. However, there are points of difference.396
The patrols’ focus on enforcement of the protection order means that they are not just victim-397
focussed but also offender-focussed. With regard to the victim, the patrols’ follow-up is more398
prolonged than in US models and tailored to individual circumstances. By deploying399
additional tools of focussed deterrence policing such as electronic tagging, they shift the onus400
of compliance onto the offender, removing the burden of personal safety work from the401
victim. This shift had already been established, in principle, by the Maria da Penha law which402
enabled the civil police and the courts to constrain the movements of the abuser, and the403
patrols have provided the necessary enforcement. Thus, the MdP patrols do not just improve404
survivors’ trust in the police to report further offences, but also significantly reduce the405
likelihood of re-offending on the part of abusers.406
The women’s police stations constituted an important earlier innovation in offering407
women an alternative first-response institutional space in which to report domestic violence408
and get help (Carrington et al, 2020). However, the evidence is weak that, by themselves,409
they prevent further victimization, including feminicide (Perova & Reynolds, 2017), given410
that women have to seek out the investigative police after the fact. The MdP patrols411
developed to fill the enforcement gap and form a necessary, although not sufficient, element412
of local municipal protection networks set up to assist survivors of domestic violence. These413
consist of the agencies of the criminal justice system (police stations, prosecutor’s and public414
defender’s offices, the local courts), state-provided social services, NGOs and voluntary415
groups. The patrols depend on these networks: expansion of the scheme to more cities is416
always contingent on robust local partnerships. They also add a much-needed enforcement417
dimension to these pre-existing services.418
The patrols also constitute a vital form of tertiary prevention. They go to the victim,419
rather than vice versa, and they deploy secondary prevention tools such as risk assessment in420
shaping their service response to clients. To some extent, like the women’s police stations,421
they contribute to primary prevention strategies, with patrol members giving talks about422
domestic violence in schools, civil society organizations and state bodies. In Bahia, male423
MdP patrol officers run preventive awareness sessions for men in areas reporting high levels424
of domestic violence (Bueno & Brigagão, 2018). However, primary prevention requires a425
major cultural shift in Brazilian society around women’s status, rights and bodily autonomy,426
and is a task far beyond the remit of the criminal justice system (Pasinato, Machado & Ávila,427
2019). From a critical feminist criminological perspective, the patrols throw up paradoxes.428
On the one hand, the focus on protection and prevention means that, after the first offence,429
they are arresting fewer aggressors for re-offending or violation of the court order and are430
able to divert these men into therapeutic and behavioral solutions, rather than jail. On the431
other hand, the protection framework also invites a paternalistic view of abused women as432
both ‘innocent’ and vulnerable, which partly explains why socially conservative police433
officers continue to support and advocate for these patrols. But, does it matter if a good434
policy is pursued by some for the wrong reasons as long as it works for the victims?435
User satisfaction surveys indicate that an immediate need is being met by the patrols,436
but this does not negate the poor, discriminatory, uncomprehending or condescending437
treatment that domestic violence victims still encounter within the criminal justice system,438
even from those professionals who are supposed to be specialized in handling gender-based439
violence (IJSN, 2019, p. 60). Inadequate specialist training means that victims are frequently440
still subjected to sexist, racist, classist and transphobic prejudices when trying to claim their441
right to social and physical protection. Police often have a very superficial understanding of442
domestic violence and of the Maria da Penha law. Specialist training programmes is443
generally provided to officers who volunteer for the MdP patrols but can vary from minimal444
to very comprehensive and regular. As the patrols become more institutionalized in their445
force, sessions on domestic violence are also now being incorporated into basic training for446
new recruits.447
Although the existence of the MdP patrols has improved local collaboration between448
the military or municipal police and the civil police and courts, police work is often still449
balkanized, with officers often unclear about the specific responsibilities of other partners and450
how to work with them to meet victim needs more seamlessly. Inter-agency coordination and451
coverage in a dispersed criminal justice system remain the biggest challenges to improving452
the support given to domestic violence victims. Just as the women’s police stations have453
limited geographical coverage, so MdP patrols based in the major cities are limited in their454
reach. In order to cover rural areas, therefore, all military police need training on domestic455
violence first-response intervention, whilst some states are engaging municipal guards in456
small towns to perform the second-response patrol task. Military police in Minas Gerais and457
Bahia have been developing specific outreach tools to engage women in agrarian, indigenous458
and black rural communities, in acknowledgement of their distinctive cultures (Santos, 2019).459
The strongest finding and recommendation derived from the above account is that460
comprehensive domestic violence legislation that empowers police to enforce, protect and461
prevent, rather than just mandates the arrest of offenders, is necessary to enable effective462
second-response interventions. The second recommendation is that equal attention should be463
given to both victim and abuser, given that the former’s primary concern is with the latter’s464
conduct. The third is that follow-up should be prolonged and repeated, if necessary. The465
fourth is that close working partnerships between different agencies, including those of the466
justice system, should encourage harmonised and standardized working practices that467
improve information-sharing, and prevent victims from falling through the cracks. Taken468
together, these measures can improve women’s personal safety and increase their autonomy469
and wellbeing, which, ultimately, should be the aim of any criminal justice sector policy to470
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